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TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE FOR
THE LAW OFFICE
by Louis M. Brown* and Thomas L. Shaffer**
Brown is the founder and foremost exponent of preventive law
jurisprudence. Shaffer has dwelt in recent books and essays on the
parallels between humanistic psychology and the fife of lawyers. In this
dialogue they focus their somewhat diverse insights on law as living; on
their agreement that lawyer-client decisions are law in any functional
sense of the word; and on the premise that an explicable jurisprudence is
implicit in the process of law office decision making.
BROWN: My experience in law has been as a lawyer, which is part of our
total system of the delivery of the law. The lawyer's function is complex. My
personal emphasis has been on preventive law, where the lawyer's purpose is
to guide his client so as to minimize risks, and maximize rights. Its purpose
and effect, then, is to avoid possible dispute.1
The forum is the law office rather than the courtroom. The legal matter
rarely reaches a courtroom. The final legal determination takes place in the law
office. The legal decisions are finalized by the lawyer. In this context, the
decisional process of the lawyer is as significant for a particular client as would
be the decision of a court for a litigant.
SHAFFER: That suggests two novelties one does not ordinarily find in the
literature of jurisprudence- (1) lawyer as decision maker,2 and (2) lawyer as
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Southern California; member of the California
Bar.
** Dean, Notre Dame Law School.
1 L. Brown, Planning By Lawyers (1967); L. Brown, "The Practice of Preventive Law,"
35 Jour. Amer. Jud. Soc. 45 (1951); L. Brown, "Legal Autopsy," 39 Ibid. 47 (1955); L.
Brown, "The Law Office-A Preventive Law Laboratory," 104 U. Penn. L. Rev. 940
(1956); L. Brown, "Law Offices for Middle-Income Clients," 40 lour. St. Bar Calif. 720
(1965); L. Brown, "Legal Audit," 38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 431 (1965); other citations in L.
Brown, Articles On Preventive Law (1969).
2 The greatest of all common law judges described something of the dilemma of decision,
and hinted at the affective loneliness of it when he rejected easy analogies of property
ownership in an appealing wrongful death case, in Hynes v. New York Central R. Co., 231
N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921); "rights and duties in systems of living law are not built
upon such quicksands." In enlarging upon the process, he said-B. Cardozo, The Growth
of the Law (1924), p. 99:
The vigils and the quest yield at most of few remote analogies, which can be
turned as easily to the service of one side as to the service of the other. What are
you going to do to persuade? What am I going to do to decide? Perhaps we shall,
neither of us, be fully conscious of the implications of the process. Much that goes
on in the mind is subconscious or nearly so. But if, when the task is finished, we
125
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counselor (what Carl Rogers would call a "helping person"). It suggests a
challenge too: If jurisprudence cannot address those professional realities, it
cannot learn from lawyers and it cannot teach lawyers about their personal-
professional lives.
My special concern is the human relationship within which this law office
decisional process occurs, and out of which law office legal decisions emerge.
3
As decisions here parallel judicial judgments, I suggest that the legal counseling
relationship parallels relationships between judge and jury,4 or relationships
between judges as makers of law and legal custom or other branches of govern-
ment as makers of law.5 We do not have a jurisprudence of counseling.
Legal counseling develops much of its jurisprudence from modern human-
istic psychology. The counselor relates at a person-to-person level in which
feelings (his own and his client's) are relevant as facts. And he operates within
a set of concerns in which counselor behavior is more useful than conflict
(advocacy) behavior. Rogers 6 generalizes these concerns as:
acceptance of the client ("unconditional positive regard"); understanding
of the client (empathy); and self-awareness (congruence).
The jurisprudence implicit in the image of lawyer as helping person is an
optimistic jurisprudence. The Rogerian model is that people are resourceful
enough to amend and repair their lives. Humanistic psychology seeks to tap
ask ourselves what we have done, we shall find, if we are frank in the answer, that
with such equipment as we have, we have been playing the philosopher.
If one seeks something a bit more pragmatic by way of explanation, he may find guidance
to the judicial process and analogies to the affective content, and the limits, of a decision
made by a person or consortium of persons in a lawyer's office. T. Shaffer, Readings on
the Common Law (1967), p. 42:
Government has undertaken to resolve private disputes out of nothing more
recondite than the demand made upon government to keep the peace. And it has
found that some consistency and objectivity is needed in resolving disputes-perhaps
because Browning's king, or Calaban [in "Pippa Passes" and "Calaban Upon
Setebos," both literary analogies suggested by Pollock], or the theocratic judge
of colonial Massachusetts were not in practice capable of keeping the peace for
long. (That is a pragmatic way to describe an aspiration to objective decision.
Most men would probably find it hard to achieve a description which did not
include the word "justice.")
s Most of my work has been in the "estate-planning" practice-e.g.: Death, Property
and Lawyers (1971); Planning and Drafting Wills and Trusts (1972), Ch. I; "Three Models
for the Estate-Planning Counselor," in the Proceedings of the 1972 Estate Planning Institute,
University of Miami. See R. Grismer and T. Shaffer, "Experience-Based Teaching Methods
in Legal Counseling," 19 Cleveland State Law Review 448 (1970).
4 L. Green, Judge and Jury (1930); see Reid, "A Peculiar Mode of Expression (Judge
Doe's Use of the Distinction Between Law and Fact)," 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 427; cf. T.
Shaffer, "Appellate Courts and Prejudiced Verdicts," 26 Univ. of Pittsburgh L. Rev. 1
(1964).
5 Cf. L. Fuller, "Human Interaction and the Law," 14 Amer. lour. Juris. 1 (1969).
6 C. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (1965); see C. Rogers, On Becoming A Person
(1961).
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human resources, as the physician taps physical resources, in the hope that the
human psyche regenerates.
But the helping-person model7 in a law office jurisprudence narrows and
professionalizes this humanistic view of clients. That is where Rogers' insights
are tempered by your preventive law concept; viewing the law office product
as a legal decision suggests the qualities of foresight and comprehension. The
optimistic view of man is specialized into a prudent view of man; because of
his counselor, the client understands the consequences of his actions. He agrees
in advance to the consequences of his decision in the law office, in an inter-
personal instance of Dewey's logic-of-consequences concept.8 Law office
jurisprudence is like conflict jurisprudence, but different because it is also a
helping-person jurisprudence. It is like the helping-person philosophy prom-
inent in nonlegal counseling, but different because the law office process is a
process of decision making.
The decision in the law office is assented to by at least two people, but,
like "justice" writ large, it depends for its validity on a consensus that reaches
beyond the law office. A litigated decision must be "just"-that is, it must
satisfy most of the people most of the time. A law office decision must be pre-
ventive; it must satisfy the people who live with its consequences. Nonlegal
counseling can afford to pay less attention to consequences and consensus.
It aims at information and at the facilitation of decision making by the client.9
But legal counseling is always done in the shadow of external, even institu-
tional, validation. The legal counselor has to make up his mind; other coun-
selors often do not.10
One further consequence of law office jurisprudence is the social effect
of the law office decision. A lawyer who advises his corporate client to sail
less close to the winds of the Internal Revenue Code is making a decision with
accounting consequences, risk consequences, and social consequences analogous
to the consequences of the same sort of decision being made in the Tax Court.
BROWN: The legal counselor is frequently mentioned in texts on professional
responsibility,"I usually in the context of dispute resolution. The lawyer con-
sulted regarding dispute resolution is also a helping person. I do not think
7 The model is developed more advertently in T. Shaffer, note 3, supra (U. Miami).
8 J. Dewey, "Logical Method and Law," 10 Cornell L. Quar. 17 (1924).
9 These generalizations are developed in L. Tyler, The Work of the Counselor (3d ed.
1969).
10 See E. Porter, An Introduction to Therapeutic Counseling (1950).
11 V. Countryman and T. Finman, The Lawyer in Modern Society (1966), p. 310-313;
E. Cheatham, Cases and Materials on the Legal Profession (1955), p. 220-227. See also
Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy--Especially in Commercial
Transactions (1946), p. 167; Redmount, "Humanistic Law through Legal Counselling,"
2 Conn. L. Rev. 98 (1969).
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that either of us means to exclude this sort of counseling function, though we
would try to differentiate the litigating (dispute resolving) lawyering function
from the preventive law lawyering function. The litigating lawyer, in the
last analysis, can and frequently does rely upon a lawsuit for resolution. He
may counsel a client, but he does so against a backdrop of ultimate court de-
cision.
You point up a social consequence of law office, preventive law jurispru-
dence. There are social consequences, as you say, of law office decisions. One
of the specific social consequences of effective preventive law counseling is that
it tends to reduce the incidence of legal trouble.
We assume that some alternatives are legally safer than others. There is
a jurisprudential foundation for this premise. It lies within a formula which
can be diagrammed as FACT -> LAW (or legal consequence). There can be
no legal consequence save that which rests upon some factual occurrence(s).
Change or alter facts and you may modify legal consequences.' 2 It does make
a difference in legal consequences whether a person does or does not sign
on the dotted line. One set of words, rather than another set of words, can
12 "Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts which the law
defines. .. ." 0. Holmes, The Common Law (1881), p. 214.
"When a rule of law has been reduced to words it is a statement of the legal effect of
operative facts; i.e., it is a statement that certain facts will normally be followed by certain
immediate or remote consequences in the form of action or non-action by the judicial and
executive agents of society." A. Corbin, "Legal Analysis and Terminology," 29 Yale L.J.
163, 164 (1919).
"Every legal proposition that contains a norm attaches a command or a prohibition to
a given set of facts as the legal consequence of the latter." E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Prin-
ciples of the Sociology of Law '(W. Moll transl. 1936), p. 194-195.
"A legal directive can be expressed in the formula: If F, then C, where F stands for
facts and C for legal consequence indicating how the judge shall judge." A. Ross, On
Law and Justice '(1959), p. 214.
"The power thus conferred on individuals to mold their legal relations with others by
contracts, wills, marriages, etc., is one of the great contributions of law to social life; and
it is a feature of law obscured by representing all law as a matter of orders backed by
threats." H. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), p. 28.
"The vast majority of legal norms are correctly regarded as hypothetical statements
establishing that if certain facts are found, certain legal consequences follow." J. Stone,
Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964), p. 199.
"Every rule of law is predicated on the existence of the facts on which its operation
proceeds, its function (or 'the lawmaker's intention') being to attach legal consequences to
those facts. Different rules attach different consequences to different facts; which rule we
apply, then with its consequences, depends on what facts are found." J. Stone, Social
Dimensions of Law and justice (1966), p. 734-735.
"To a certain set of facts '(a broken contract), this rule appends certain consequences
(a particular measure of damages)." Friedman, "Legal Rules and the Process of Social
Change," 19 Stanford L. Rev. 786, 787 (1967).
"For if you analyze any body of facts interpreted as 'legal' or somehow tied up with
law, such as . . . a judgment, a contract . . . two elements are distinguishable: one, an act
or series of acts-a happening occurring at a certain time and in a certain place, perceived
by our senses: an external manifestation of human conduct; two, the legal meaning of this
act, that is the meaning conferred upon the act by law." H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of
Law, 2d Ed., M. Knight transl. (1967), p. 2.
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make a legal difference in the rights and duties of the parties. Because legal
consequences are constructed on facts, preventive law guidance is possible.
The helping lawyer seeks to guide the client so as to maximize his rights and
minimize his risks.
SHAFFER: An example from my observation in the practice: We had a
corporate client with large industrial plants in the Deep South. Our client
was a fourth-tier contractor with the federal government, which meant then
that he had some, but very slight, duties to racially integrate his workers. Our
client had discussed this with my senior in the firm, who asked me to research
the client's duties under a presidential executive order on equal employment
opportunity. I drafted a memorandum outlining the client's minimal duties.
My senior, with my memo in hand, telephoned the secretary of the corpora-
tion; he said we had reviewed the situation and that our advice was to fully
integrate the plants. This advice had all of the jurisprudential clarity of
Brown v. Board of Education.
13
This law office decision was beyond the letter of the law, as most law office
decisions, from income tax to the corrupt practices act, are. (That may be a
difference between counseling and a sort of technical journalism.) I have
often wondered why my senior gave the advice he did:
1. He may have been putting his own social opinions into his legal coun-
seling;
2. He may have believed that the law was in a process in which it would
soon reach this client with full integration requirements;
3. In addition to "2" he may have assessed the economic and human
costs of compliance, which were great in this case, and have decided that
early compliance was cheapest.
4. He may have assessed the moral implications of full integration, in
terms of the client's ethical situation. This is my preferred speculation; it
involves consideration of a wide array of factors-the conscience of the
executives we were advising, corporate image, the welfare of the workers
(especially black workers), the social posture of the South and of the nation
at that time, and, most important, his perception of the moral openness of
the men he was advising. Any of these factors implies a role for the cor-
poration as moral leader in the community.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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This man's legal counseling style was consistently effective. He was and is a
supremely successful lawyer. His style obviously has everything to do with
his success. More to our present point, though, is the fact that his decision-mak-
ing process considered "the logic of consequences" with a comprehension at
least equal to that of the Supreme Court of the United States.
14
BROWN: The example you give reveals the tremendous significance of law
office decisions. Examples also come in less complicated circumstances. Every
testator makes decisions in connection with testamentary provisions or a lawyer
makes decisions on his behalf. These provisions may very well later affect
lives and conduct of several persons. Every time a client consults a lawyer
regarding a proposed course of conduct, the decision reached affects lives.
SHAFFER: We have been talking about social consequences. A great and
grand lawyer under whom I practiced law, Kurt F. Pantzer of Indianapolis,
used to tell us that our planning and draftsmanship in the corporate and
"estate planning" practice had to respond to an "equitable sanction." At its
simplest level, I suppose, you could ask of your work product in the profes-
sion, "Is it fair?" But the question has deep implications. What is fair? I
suppose a practicing lawyer's answer to the question would be that what is
fair is what works, and I think that implies what we have been calling con-
sensus. A fair decision is one that will be accepted and implemented without
litigation. Litigation is to the bad office decision what armed rebellion is to
the bad judicial decision.
The counseling function itself seems to operate between the poles of blocked
decision making and paucity of information. A teacher of counselors, Profes-
sor Leona E. Tyler of the University of Oregon, has expressed this range of
functions in terms of what the counselor sees as the immediate demands of the
relationship. 15 At the inception of the situation the counselor may perceive
that his client is in need of information. His function would then seem to be
to survey possibilities for the client, with information, so that he acts as a
kind of lecturer. He presents the alternatives and the client moves to a choice
based on them. This function assumes that the client has sound mental equip-
ment and a well-tuned ability to receive and act upon information. It con-
cludes, as you carefully emphasize, with a survey of the consequences of deci-
sion. Foresight is central to the legal counselor in this sort of case. Professor
Tyler calls this a "choice case."
14 Of course behavioral insights are not explicated-or at least not usually. Beginning
perhaps with Brown, it has become legitimate to explicate those in opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
15 Supra, note 9.
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At the other extreme, the client may be unable to decide, so that he is
not receptive to information because he cannot use it. I think this situation
arises most often in cases where the real dilemma is not on the table; an
example I use in teaching legal counseling (and which I think I borrowed
from you) is the client whose apparent issue is how to take title to residential
real estate but whose real issue is his marriage. Another example (which I
borrow from Professor Harrop Freeman)16 is the client who thinks he needs
to decide whether to sue his neighbor over a property dispute, but whose real
dilemma lies in his relationship with the tough guys in his life, in his own in-
ability to recognize and act upon his outrage at being dealt with unfairly by
those around him.
In this kind of case, what Professor Tyler calls the "change case," the
counselor's function is more delicate. Obstacles to decision have to be re-
moved, new possibilities created. In the examples I use, the issue of the mar-
riage has to surface and the possibilities of dealing with it, rather than with the
red herring of title, have to be explored. In the property dispute, the fact is
the client's need for someone to fight his battles for him. Either situation calls,
much more than the choice case, for the array of counselor skills as Rogers
gives them-acceptance, empathy, and understanding.
There are intermediate categories, of course, and I suspect that most of
a lawyer's work is in intermediate situations. Professor Tyler puts these situa-
tions well when she says that the dilemma they present is that the "client's
present possibilities cannot be evaluated without greater understanding of
him." The counselor needs to search, study, observe, and test his own reaction
and his client's.
In the property dispute example, the client's inability to face down his
antagonist is at bottom a special kind of fear. To the extent that the lawyer
accepts the invitation to fight the client's battle for him, he will create an
indefinite dependence. It resembles what the psychoanalysts talk about as the
patient's "transference."' 17 Maybe what the client really needs is to stand
on his own two feet; I believe the lawyer who contributed the case to Free-
man's book was left with the nagging impression that it was this dependence
which was the real fact at issue in -the case, and that his analysis of the fact
in more traditional, litigable terms led him astray.1 8 He didn't do the client
any service when he threatened suit and forced settlement. The client had
16 The case of "The Barricaded Road," in H. Freeman, Legal Interviewing and Counseling
(1963), p. 215.
17 See T. Shaffer, Death, Property, and Lawyers (1971), Ch. VII.
Is The lawyer who contributed the case said, note 16 supra at 216: "Now, I'm a pretty
forthright man. I played football in college, I don't believe the bogeyman goes away by
hiding your head. I was pretty disgusted with my client ......
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his easement, but he didn't have his manhood. Consideration of the client's
emotional equipment as a fact which influences the direction of decision in
the law office is an awesome demand on a mere lawyer's talents. But a deci-
sion which ignores this fact, or misperceives it, or cooperates with the client
in ignoring it, is likely to be a bad decision. And by "bad" I mean that it will
work less well-will have worse consequences-than it would if the fact had
been taken into account.
BROWN: In curative law, we seek to determine and manage past facts, and
attach the desired legal consequences to them. At this level legal consequences
can be attached without any consideration of the client's emotional involve-
ment. In general, the client's total emotional equipment is not usually part of
the word formula in codes of law. I believe, though, that the total environment
does become involved in the lawyering process. That process includes, but is
not limited to, the law -> fact formula. An elemental translation of that
formula leads to the question-what is the applicable law or legal result? But,
and here is where I come to agree with you, the answer to that question is often
insufficient for lawyering. In earthy terms, the client's questions are: What do
I do? What course of action? What decisions must I make, or do you, as my
lawyer, make?
In preventive law practice the law -- fact formula provides the legal con-
sequences to a proposed course of action, but does not provide the answer to
the ultimate decision, that is, for example, should the client sign. In litigation
practice the lawyer may make or decline to make a prediction of an attain-
able legal result if his client, or potential client, brings a lawsuit, but the law-
yering (and client) decision is whether and when to bring the suit. That
decision and determination, does, as you suggest, include the consideration of
the "client's emotional equipment."
SHAFFER: The irrational facts--the emotional and feeling facts which Bar-
rett19 attributes to our Judaic tradition-may well be the greatest distinction
between office lawyering and what you call "curative law." In this connection,
I find useful your recognition that law office decision making is a vastly more
complex (and, if I may say so, more openly emotional) environment. Three
preliminary points should be made about that distinction, though.
First, litigation decisions, especially those we in retrospect regard as his-
toric, have never been confined in conception or consequences to the facts in
the record. They have always reflected what Holmes called "the felt neces-
19 W. Barrett, Irrational Man (1958).
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sity of time." 20 And, I think, good legal counselors take the emotional climate
of a case into account when they act or advise in reference to probable judicial
(or, for that matter, legislative) decisions in the case. You and I know that
the fact that a child is black is not a legitimate (constitutional) consideration
in his assignment to public school, and would so advise a Los Angeles school
official who wondered if he could segregate schools. But, as we discovered
recently,21 the child's race would be a perfectly legitimate consideration if we
were desegregating schools--and I suppose we both would have predicted that
decision, despite our belief in the absolute that the Constitution is color blind.
Predictive law is an art not entirely unlike predictive psychology.
Second, litigation law (law which comes from the fact -+ law continuum)
is not very useful, and is rarely dispositive, in legal counseling. Part of the
reason is that good law office decision making comes from a preventive law
stance in the lawyer; and that "lawyering" stance always takes broader account
of human factors than predictive law does. Another part of the reason is that
the client who is making a law office decision is being counseled toward an
ability to choose as well as toward choice itself. The legal counselor is in what
our friend Robert S. Redmount 2 2 calls a facilitative posture.
Finally, the law office decision depends for its soundness and survival on
acceptance and validation in people and in places where factors relevant to
litigation either don't count, or don't count enough.2 3 An example is a dead
man's will which depends in its operative phase on the largely emotional con-
sent of family members who take or fail to take under it.24 The factors relating
to judges' law in both of these examples are usually, literally, irrelevant.
BROWN: If I, or any lawyer, want to know what the law is, his sources of
information about law are the same whether he is lawyering in litigation
or preventive law. For me, on an analytical level, the difference between
preventive law and litigation lies not in a difference in law. Rather it lies in
a difference in fact. If a philosopher would say that facts exist in space and
time, then the difference is in the time aspect of fact. This is, some events
have already occurred, they are in the past. Other events will occur in the
future. At least, I think that we can agree that facts or events have a time
20 0. Holmes, The Common Law (1881), p. 1. See B. Cardozo, note 2, supra; J. Dewey,
note 8, supra; E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1958).
21 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 91 S.Ct. 1267 (1971).
22 See R. Redmount, "Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling," 2 Connecticut L.
Rev. 98 (1969).
23 S. Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study," 28 Am.
Soc. Rev. 55 (1963), and S. Tilles, "Understanding the Consultant's Role," 39 Harvard Bus.
Rev. 87 (1961), both reproduced in L. Brown, Planning By Lawyers (1967).
24 M. Sussman, J. Cates and D. Smith, The Family and Inheritance (1970); see my
review at 18 U.C.L.A. Law Review 844 (1971).
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characteristic. We place facts in time, as well as space. In these time phenom-
ena, the litigating lawyer primarily is concerned with some existing dispute
arising out of past facts which I sometimes identify as "cold" facts. He wants
to know what happened in the past that gave rise to the dispute. The sub-
stantive legal consequences are determined by the law as it applies to those
previous facts/events.
Preventive law is chiefly concerned with future facts, that is, facts which
have not yet occurred and which in some writings I have labelled "hot" facts.
Earlier I said that I assume alternative possibilities of action, that is, a choice
of facts. Preventive law is concerned with the exercise of the choice so as to
minimize risks and maximize rights. Whatever facts occur (or fail to occur)
there will be some legal consequences. Signing one's name on a legally signif-
icant document, e.g., a check) gives rise immediately to certain identifiable
legal consequences. Not signing that same check gives rise, analytically, to
certain other legal consequences, 25 i.e., a body of negative legal consequences,
"no-rights."
When we consider the practice of law, we put another dimension into
the process. The lawyer practicing litigation law practices in the realm of re-
solution of disputes arising out of past facts. His practices, procedures, and
processes, however, are concerned with some current and future events, that is,
the resolution of the dispute is a future event. In the resolution of that dis-
pute, he may work with the current human environment, for example, as you
put forth, the client's emotional equipment. Or, he may feel the need in highly
critical controversies reaching appellate courts to make some measure of "the
felt necessity of the time."
In the practice of preventive law, the lawyering process can be more com-
plex. Elementary preventive law practice appears relatively simple; that is,
the lawyer describes (predicts) for a client the legal consequences of a pro-
posed course of action. The lawyer informs a client about to sign an apart-
ment lease already signed by the landlord that his client's signature creates, in
the usual situation, a legal obligation (to pay rent, etc.) and some legal rights
(to occupy the premises, etc.). But a more extended preventive law practice
might be addressed to predictions in a different realm. The preventive law
issues can become predictions as to whether a dispute will likely arise in the
future, and if a dispute arises, then a prediction as to the behavior of the
parties during that dispute, and a prediction of the legal consequences of that
dispute. When we think in terms of potential disputes, we are concerned with
only the "minimizing risks" aspect of preventive law practice. The practice
25 The nature of such consequences is outlined in W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Con-
ceptions (1923).
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of "maximizing rights" complicates the process. It is at this point that the
lawyering creativity stretches one's imagination. The issue is not confined
to determining which alternative course of action presented by the client for
the lawyer's consideration is best calculated to maximize the client's position;
but, in addition, whether there is or might be another (as yet unstated)
course of action even more appropriate, and which may further improve the
client's legal (and practical) position. It is in this realm that I find correct
your statement that litigation law is not dispositive in preventive law counsel-
ing.
Preventive law contemplates a prediction, as I said, as to whether a dis-
pute will arise. That is a prediction of human behavior. Further, even if a
dispute should arise, there is need to consider (or predict) the probable effect
(or procedure) regarding that dispute; for example, will a lawsuit result.
Preventive law is concerned, among other things, with a prediction as to
whether a lawsuit will be brought because preventive law practice seeks to
minimize risks, including the practical risk that a client may later be required
to defend a lawsuit. Furthermore, in terms of lawsuits (acknowledged to be
a costly process in our society), we seek to minimize the risk that our client
will find it necessary to become a plaintiff, i.e., to sue in order to seek his sub-
stantive rights.
Now this whole area of the prediction of dispute, and prediction that law-
suit will be brought, is almost wholly ignored in jurisprudence, in empirical
research, and in legal education.2 6 In a short paper, I once sought to begin
an exploration of the decision to file a lawsuit. One of the factors, of course,
is the litigant's view of the likelihood of legal success, 2 7 but I would guess that
such a factor is only one of several. There will probably not be a lawsuit
unless preceded by a dispute, so that prediction of dispute-another human
environmental phenomenon outside that fact -- law continuum-needs in-
26 But see F. O'Neal and J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates
(1961).
27 Among the factors that might be considered as motivating the filing of a lawsuit are
the following:
*(a) File a lawsuit whenever a client has an assertable claim.
(b) File a suit in order to bind the attorney/client relationship.
(c) Easier to get a fee if suit is filed.
(d) If I don't file suit, another lawyer will.
(e) Client insists on filing.
(f) It's easier to handle the client if suit is filed.
'(g) The client's interests are better protected by filing suit.
(h) Must file in order to attach or garnish.
(i) Client's settlement posture is improved by filing.
(j) We should take the initiative, so we should become plaintiff, rather than risk
the possibility that the other side will sue and we become defendant.
(k) If we sue, we have a better chance to determine the forum.
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vestigation. Given the same external facts, people may well act differently.
One will sue now. The other will wait. A third may ignore the situation.
SHAFFER: The office analogue for social climate, I think, is interpersonal
climate. It bears on decisions. It is to office decision what social climate is
to judicial decision. (As, at least in part, client feelings are to office decision
what facts are to judicial decision.) The heart of counseling effectiveness,
wherever it falls on the spectrum from pure information to pure "therapy,"
is the client's ability to trust the counselor. A climate of trust is what Rogers
means when he talks about acceptance, understanding, and empathy. The
issues of trust, dependence, choice, personal growth, and client maturity all
turn on the climate which the counselor creates. Many lawyers are poor at
building a healthy, constructive, nonmanipulative law office climate for the
people who come to them with worry and trouble and doubt.
28
Two issues involved in the creation of interpersonal climate are trouble-
some to the law students I work with on legal counseling. Both bear on your
discussion of law office environment. One issue is self-awareness; the other
is what modern applied behavioral scientists (with an unacknowledged debt
to electrical engineering) call "feedback."
A law and psychology class I had several years ago spent three sessions
on role-playing excursions into counseling, planning, and bargaining. One
student developed an elaborate, well-thought-out system of negotiation tactics;
a team of students presented a practical exercise in persuasion behavior; an-
other team presented a psychodrama of the counseling opportunity.
When it was all over, I had the conviction that our focus had been wrong-
that we had been looking at the client side of the relationship, which was un-
real because none of us was a client; we had been avoiding our own feelings;
and we had been fooling ourselves as to the psychological importance of the
elements of the counseling relationship which were right in front of us.
2 9
It was for some reason easier to talk about the not-present, not-timely (and
therefore unreal) client psyche than to talk about our own:
A common mistake is to ignore the emotional factors. The man [read
"lawyer"] who pretends to himself that he is a rational calculating machine,
moved only by ideas and concerned only for correctness, suffers from a
grave illusion. He may have ceased to recognize his feelings, but emotions
have not ceased to stimulate his glands and to twist his guts. He cannot
28 See R. Grismer and T. Shaffer, note 3, supra.
2 "Emotional Problems in Groups and Organizations," Reading Book, Laboratories in
Human Relations Training (N.T.L. Institute, 1969 ed.), p. 7.
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live a sane life until he relaxes his severe repressions and becomes once
again able to feel.
In effect they [lawyers] say, "We have work to do. Let's lay aside ill
feelings and buckle down to business !" All that happens then is that feel-
ings are forced to operate under the table. What is said on the surface
may resemble the give and take of ideational ping-pong balls, batted back
and forth; but under the table, if your ear is attuned to it, you can hear
heavy bowling balls being rolled by participants at their opponents.
The test of a good decision, one which will be carried out wholeheart-
edly, is not whether it has been unemotionally made, but rather whether
all of the emotions involved have been expressed, recognized, and taken
into account. Innumerable business decisions are bad because they have
been devised on the assumption that feelings can be laid aside or ignored.
It is not surprising that people who for years have pretended to others
that they feel what they don't really feel, should lose their ability to dis-
criminate among their own emotions.
One of the values of the feedback which we give one another ... is
that it tells us about some of our feelings which are more apparent to
others than to us.
I had the impression that many of us in that class undertook the study of law
and psychology in order to understand the people we deal with professionally-
clients, brothers at the bar, judges, juries, etc. But one of the principal lessons
I took from our classroom demonstrations was the importance of learning
about ourselves. In the practice of law, I learned, we have to find out about
the person doing as well as well as the person done to.
30
"Feedback," the second issue, is a difficult art for most lawyers. The goal
of good feedback to a client is to show him the consequences of his style and
the subtleties of what he is doing. The idea is to help him gear his behavior
for effective movement toward his goals. The trick is to help him without
judging him. And it is hard for us lawyers to be nonevaluative-mostly, I
suppose, because lawyers are moralistic people before they come to law school.
Our moralistic temperaments were attracted to the study of law.3 ' Law
school-with its dark labyrinths of fault, malice, breach, good faith, and
dogs who know the difference between being stepped over and being kicked-
reinforces our tendencies to pass judgment.
3o See B. Glaser and A. Strauss, Awareness of Dying (1965) ; C. Jung, "The Psychology of
the Transference," 16 The Collected Works (Ballinger 2nd ed. 1966).
31 A. Watson, "The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education," 37 Cincinnati L. Rev. 93 (1968).
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But good law office climate needs a lawyer who will level with the client
about what the client is doing, what the client's style is, and what the inter-
personal environment is really like, but do it without adding to the client's
feeling that he is either stupid or bad. "In almost every phase of our lives...
we find ourselves under the rewards and punishments of external judgments,"
Rogers says. "'That's good'; 'That's naughty' .. .. Such judgments are a
part of our lives from infancy to old age."3 2
Applied behavioral science suggests these are some skills needed for effec-
tive feedback.
1. It should describe, not evaluate. The client should be free to use it or
not use it, as the client sees fit. If one pursued that idea in law practice, he
might decide finally that the traditional ideal of lawyer independence is over-
blown, or at least misapplied. A moving and personal argument for that pos-
sibility was made recently by a young poverty lawyer. Here are some thoughts
of his:
33
The dominant attitude in law school is that the client is a troublesome
pain-in-the-neck. Occasionally, the law student hears hints that he should
present his clients with the legal alternatives, among which the client
should choose. Many lawyers are now aware that people should control
their lawyer, and are beginning to present alternatives from which their
clients can choose. But the control which poor people should exercise over
their lawyer is much greater than that of merely selecting among his pro-
posals .... (B) ecause they know what is helpful to them and possible for
them, they can and must structure their own alternatives and make their
own choices....
The lawyer may know what the law can do; the people know what needs
to be done, and what can be done. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Wexler's insight will shock many lawyers, I think. Most of us, accustomed
as we are to being guru, shaman, and Delphic Oracle to our clients, will not
be able to accept it. But it could be the ultimate humanistic climate to which
a sensitive study of the law office encounter would lead.
2. Feedback is specific. "John, you're trying to dominate me" may be
a true observation, but it is less likely to be acted upon than "John, just now,
when you and I were discussing that lease, I had the feeling you were not
listening to me. I had the feeling, just then, that you want me to agree with
you, regardless of what I thought."
32 C. Rogers, in .upra, note 6, at 73.
33 S. Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People," 79 Yale Law Journal 1049 (1970).
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3. Feedback takes needs into account-needs of client as well as needs of
counselor. A lawyer acts, in the nature of things, from a position of enormous
interpersonal power.34 And pushing people around gets to be fun. We all
know an occasional sadistic lawyer who uses his influence over clients, and
junior colleagues, and clerks in public offices, for entertainment. Paradox-
ically, though, a person cannot move toward action with sensitivity for others
until he recognizes and accepts the demands of his own needs.
4. Feedback is directed toward behavior the client can change. It won't
do anybody anything but injury to tell a client that he is stupid or evil or old
or infirm. What is really involved when a "helping person" takes that tack,
of course, is misdirected aggression in the counselor. Compare the classic
model of a Socratic law teacher, who abuses law students, perhaps because
he lacks enough status or enough opportunity to abuse his professional peers
as much as he wants. Another side of destructive feedback is that it is usually
a misperception. The client I perceive as impotent because old or infirm may
simply be coming across that way. He may, out of some need of his own,
want to appear old or infirm; that may be his manipulative device ("poor
little me"). If that is so, and I am perceiving accurately, it may do him a
world of good to have the benefit of my perception. (Can I give it to him
without appearing judgmental?)
5. Feedback is best when solicited. Not all law office situations imply a
desire in the client for honest reaction, but many do-and the best feedback
comes to him who wants it and says so. Another and more helpful way to
put the point is that the most useful reaction is in terms of a question the client
asks for himself. I must say, for myself, that it often takes courage to answer
questions such as "Do you think I'm being selfish?" or "Does it seem to you
that I'm fooling myself about this matter?" or "Do I seem to you to be vindic-
tive?" I hope for the courage to deal with that sort of question honestly, to
deal with it in a way which leaves the client free to act, and to help him with-
out making him dependent on me.
6. Feedback is well timed. The time to answer personal questions (like
those above) is when they are asked. That's when the counselor's reaction is
most honest. Delay suggests evaluation.
7. Feedback is checked. An honest reaction, based on an immediate per-
ception may, for all its candor, be wrong. One way to find out, consequently
to keep personal channels of communication intact, and to guard against
evaluative feedback, is to ask if the perception seems right to the client: "Yes,
I have a feeling that you are being vindictive. Does it seem that way to you,
too?"
34 A. Watson, Psychiatry for Lawyers (1968); Ch. 1.
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The jurisprudential point is the hope that counseling--and especially
legal counseling-will be a process which produces freedom. It should help
the client to broaden his horizons as a social creature, to be freer. As Rogers
says, counseling should "permit the other person to reach the point where he
recognizes that the locus of evaluation, the center of responsibility, lies within
himself. The meaning and value of his experience is in the last analysis some-
thing which is up to him, and no amount of external judgment can alter
this." 3 5
I don't intend to supplant the lawyer's expertise as an informed profes-
sional. I am talking about the climate in which he uses his knowledge.
BROWN: The lawyer/client consultation is a mixture of law and counseling.
Both are always potentially present. The legal consultation is in a human
context so that it cannot avoid or eliminate the complexities of psychological
interrelationships. However, there are times when a client consults a lawyer
concerning some nonlegal matter so that the person consulted is essentially not
acting in a strictly lawyer capacity. I would say that such a consultation is
not a lawyer/client consultation even though the person being consulted is a
lawyer. Such an observation, of course, gets us into a definition of "legal"
and "nonlegal," which harks back to the fact -- law formula. If the factual
content of the consultation concerns practical legal consequences then it in-
cludes a legal matter; otherwise it does not.
The other side of the dual aspect of consultation is more important: Every
legal consultation includes human relationships. This was a neglected aspect
of my formal legal education, and has been a significant aspect of my lawyer-
ing. In my education the emphasis (oversimplified) was upon knowing the
law and analyzing and applying it to a fixed (or relatively fixed) set of facts.
Where the lawyer/client consultation concerns preventive law, the final
decision making often occurs in the lawyer/client context. In the field of
wills to which you have given so much attention, consider the finality of law
office decisions. When the testator signs a will, he has in the usual situation
(subject only to a subsequent testamentary document, and to the rare occur-
rence of a successful will contest) committed an act of legal decisiveness as
binding as any final court judgment. The selection of an executor is fixed.
The presence or absence of a spendthrift trust provision in a testamentary
trust fixes that aspect of the trust. Because the decisional aspect of preventive
law lawyering takes place in the context of the consultation, because such deci-
sions are numerous, and because such decisions are not solely grounded upon
35 C. Rogers, supra, note 6.
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"the law," I have come to believe that jurisprudence, especially a jurispru-
dence of preventive law, must take into account the lawyer/client relation-
ship.
In the opening paragraph of your previous statement you mention that
the human factors may be the greatest difference between decisions in litiga-
tion and decisions in legal counseling, and that law offices may be more like
courtrooms than we think they are, or want them to be. Comparisons of the
decisions made are a rich source for imagination, analogies and distinctions
that can lead to important jurisprudential developments.
The ultimate decision in law courts is judgment for, or against, the liti-
gating parties. The facts upon which the judgment is made are admissible facts
brought to the decision maker. In the traditional case, the decision is in mone-
tary terms. The decision in civil cases does not directly compel action; it
neither compels the judgment debtor to pay, nor the judgment creditor neces-
sarily to do anything more. Equitable relief has generally been regarded as
an exceptional remedy. Equitable judgments can have longer term effects
and provide for continuing influence on conduct of litigants. Judgments
(sentencing) in criminal cases can provide for continuing effects on future
human conduct. Generally, all the decisions of courts concern pre-existing
disputes and impose a decision concerning the legal consequences of such dis-
putes.
The law office decision can be much like the court decision. If we had
a good historical account of law office practice it likely would show that the
basic role of the lawyer was that he was employed to pronounce or predict
probable court decision regarding a client's pre-existing dispute. A lawyer
might, however, not be obliged to make such prediction, but rather only to
present the case (i.e., present the dispute) to the court for its determination.
The lawyering profession has long since broadened its decision processes.
The lawyer is no longer confined to the presentation of dispute to a judge;
nor even to the prediction of the outcome of so doing. Lawyering decisions
involve a variety of value judgments, some of which do not lie within the
fact--law formula. Even in the traditional litigating role, the lawyer may be,
and usually is, involved in the decision to litigate. The lawyer has a wider area
for decision making, e.g., a decision not to use the litigating procedures. A
trial court, by comparison, may not decline (except on jurisdictional grounds
which itself is part of the fact-dlaw formula) to decide, i.e., to give a legal
judgment, concerning the dispute. The alternatives available in the lawyering
process are more numerous than available alternatives in the judicial process.
In addition, the lawyering process includes preventive law lawyering, a
realm that rarely, if ever, is present in the litigation process. In dispute resolu-
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tion, the facts that gave rise to the dispute are past facts so that the basic
decision (the fact --+ law decision) concerns past facts. In the preventive law
process, the facts are being made. The lawyer's decision process includes deci-
sion among alternative or multiternative 36 (if I may be permitted to coin
another word) facts. The lawyering process is further complicated because
all available possibilities are not necessarily presented to the lawyer. His func-
tion includes not only decision among choices presented by the client, but
also includes the creation and development of possibilities. 37 The lawyer not
only helps make the decision that the testator presents, e.g., whether his wife
or a trust company should be designated the executor, but the lawyer often
extends the alternative into multiternative possibilities-e.g., that the wife and
trust company be coexecutors, etc.-and then helps make the decision.
The litigating lawyer is primarily concerned with dispute. His client is
involved in some unexpected difference with one or more other claimants.
The occasion for human tension is built into the environment. The lawyer
need not be the resolver of the dispute. In the litigating process the lawyer
may shield himself personally from deciding the dispute because the resolution
of the dispute can be referred to the judge.
In preventive law practice, the lawyer sometimes works in a unilateral
environment, for example, in performing estate planning functions. In this
context, open dispute is virtually absent,38 although other psychological factors
are most certainly present. You are the forefront in demonstrating the depth
of human feelings involved in estate planning counseling process.
39
Other aspects of preventive law practice involve bilateral, or multilateral
situations, some of which may give the lawyer the view that the problems of
bilateral planning, e.g., purchase and sale of property, are synonymous with
dispute resolution in litigation. The observation that many lawyers believe
that these are similar comes from numerous discussions with litigating lawyers,
and some discussions with upper division law students. Law students educated
with traditional dispute resolution teaching materials--the appellate case-
come to believe that they are studying the totality of the real world of lawyers,
36 See Brown, "The Case of the Relived Facts," 48 Cal. L. Rev. 448 (1960).
37 Cf., with reference to planning of a transaction by a tax practitioner, B. Bittker,
Professional Responsibility and Federal Tax Practice 61 (1965). "The Case of the Relived
Facts," note 36, supra, was derived from the actual facts of a case in which I was one of
the lawyers representing the taxpayer in the litigation. The case was settled. The approach
argued in the article was used in settlement negotiations and may have been a factor in
reaching agreement.
38 This comment is not meant to neglect the notion that there is always a mathematical
possibility, remote as it might be, for dispute. The potential for dispute, though remote, is
always present. A will contest is always a theoretical possibility, but the likelihood of dispute
is remote and it is especially remote where professional guidance follows the customary
patterns.
39 See e.g., T. Shaffer, Death, Property and Lawyers (1970).
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and the law. I believe that they carry this view forward into law practice.
When I teach planning materials to upper division students, one of the prob-
lems is to put students in a legal frame of reference different from dispute
resolution. There are several differences.
Contracting parties negotiating a proposed future contract are doing so
for the purpose of determining whether they can arrive at a common ground.
Litigation is not an agreeing function; it need not resolve its differences by
reaching common ground between litigating parties. But, of course, settlement
of disputes which does seek a common ground solution is one of the significant
facts of litigation. The backdrop, against which dispute settlement is negoti-
ated, is however, that unsuccessful settlement continues to refer the dispute
to judicial decision. The result of nonaccord in preventive law negotiations
is that the differences remain unresolved-the parties "walk away." 40
The mechanisms (tools) by which the lawyer functions in these two dif-
ferent areas of law practice are different, although the law in the books is
the same. The techniques and rules for dispute resolution are, generally
speaking, provided for in the statutes and decided cases. Not necessarily so
for the preventive law lawyer. Dispute resolution decisions do not provide
answers for negotiations potentially leading to agreement, nor for counseling
in unilateral situations.
Predictions. The basic prediction which the litigating lawyer is called on
to make is a prediction concerning the likelihood of victory or defeat in liti-
gation. The area of prediction of the preventive lawyer is different. The
gut question concerns the likelihood, based on the planned program of action,
whether a dispute will likely arise. This is essentially a prediction of future
human behavior. The secondary question is, "If there is a dispute, what is the
probable outcome?"
Legal issues. For the litigating lawyer the legal issues often come ready-
made. Where the lawyer represents a prospective plaintiff, the client will
often state the dispute in such fashion that he frames the legal issue. Where
the lawyer represents the defendant, the legal issues are generally framed by
the plaintiff's pleading. In this area, the preventive law lawyer has a much
more difficult problem. He must imagine how a dispute might arise. The
preventive law lawyer might not even know who the future adversary is.41
40 There may be some interesting exceptions when management/labor negotiations break
down. Our society does provide a mechanism, conciliation, that seeks to resolve the differ-
ences. The labor law that forces bargaining simultaneously providing sanctions for "un-
fair" labor bargaining does come close to the dispute resolving functions of the litigating
process (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (5), (b) '(3) (1970).
41 In Heyer v. Flaig, 70 C.2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161, the defendant was
a lawyer sued by those who would have benefited from a will which had been incorrectly
drawn, had he drawn it correctly. Compare also the problems of the defendant's lawyer in
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Creativity. The creative function of the litigating lawyer lies in the realm
of inventiveness regarding the manner of presenting legal issues, and the
restatement of facts derived from historical events. The preventive law lawyer
exercises his creativity in the development of new facts, the guidance of future
conduct to accomplish client objectives, usually so as to avoid future disputes,
and yet maximize client rights.
SHAFFER: I recall the Mock Law Office Competition finals at your law
school in 1971. Three teams dealt there with a business client whose nar-
row legal problem was whether a security interest could be found in com-
puter "soft-ware"-in this case, security in the plans and diagrams and
thoughts the client had for fashioning a computer program for a bank. The
bank's legal department doubted that it could get a security interest under
the Uniform Commercial Code in that sort of "property," and was therefore
not willing to loan development money to the client. The client saw the prob-
lem as a typical lawyer's quibble. For some reason, he brought with him to
the lawyer's office the bank lawyer who was giving him the most trouble.
The lawyers (finalist teams from three different law schools) had a very
difficult counseling assignment. They had all of the usual human dimensions
of a new client, complicated by the fact that the client came in resenting
obstructionist lawyers and even brought the other side with him. All of the
elements of lawyering we have been talking about were present-understanding
the client, building his attitudes into the law office decision, mediating between
two quarrelling parties without losing the good will of the one (the bank)
or the loyalty of the other (the client). All three teams did a credible job,
but-and this is the crucial part of the image-each of them approached the
situation in a unique way.
I showed parts of that film to my class in legal counseling at Notre Dame
in the fall, did not tell them how the judges decided the winner in the com-
petition, and asked them to decide who won. One of the teams had ap-
proached the problem with great determination to maintain control of the
situation (the lawyer's game-in Eric Berne's sense of game-that I call
"I'm in Charge Here").42 Another team showed less concern about control
but decided on a competitive strategy which showed the client that the lawyers
were on his side and which put the bank lawyer on the defensive. The third
team showed least concern for control, most concern for a flow of communica-
predicting his client's adversary in Williams u. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 '(1962) and
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
42 "Estate Planning" Games, Notre Dame Lawyer (1972).
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tion among all three corners of the meeting, and the least amount of competi-
tive feeling in the client's behalf.
My students, overwhelmingly, thought that the second team-the strong
advocates-did the best job. It will come as no surprise to you that I thought,
and still think, my students were wrong. (So, as it turned out, did the other
judges in the finals.) What interests me, in looking back on my class and on
the finals themselves, is how I find myself defending my choice. It says a lot
about me, a lot about the way I approach legal education, and a lot about
the hopes I have for a lawyering jurisprudence.
One way to look at the M.L.O.C. finals is in terms of what a counselor-
any counselor-is supposed to be able to contribute to his counselee. In a
phrase which merely summarizes what I have been trying to say throughout
our dialogue, the counselor is there to move his counselee from hang-up to
action. The counselee (client) is stymied, frustrated, maybe confused. For
some reason he cannot act. The counselor is there to deal with that freeze in
human activity. In a psychologically serious case, as the discussions of Tyler
emphasized, it may be necessary to help the client move to behavior in which
he is able to choose. Lawyers cannot always avoid dealing with such situa-
tions. But, usually, psychopathology is not a pressing problem; what the
client usually needs is a new perspective on his options. We M.L.O.C. judges
chose the third team in the M.L.O.C. finals-in this analysis-because the
third team, which was least concerned about controlling the action, least con-
cerned about maintaining their own ascendancy in an inevitably competitive
setting, did the best job of opening up options for the client, and for the bank
lawyer. They talked (as I recall) about several alternative ways to secure the
loan from the bank to the client; they talked about renegotiating the entire
arrangement, so that it became a development contract rather than a loan.
Most crucially, they interested the client and the bank lawyer in these optional
avenues of solution. They were really good at assessing and illuminating the
fact-law continuum in this case and at creative preventive lawyering.
A second way to defend us M.L.O.C. judges from the Perry Mason reac-
tions of my students is to assess that law office situation in competitive terms.
There is a strong current of competition in any counseling situation. 43 Legal
counselors are less likely to avoid a competitive atmosphere than most other
kinds of counselors are, because we lawyers are attracted to competition, de-
velop it, seek it, and-most of us, most of the time-act it out with clients in
some variant of the "I'm in Charge Here" game. The M.L.O.C. problem
which you presented aggravated this tendency to competition by bringing both
sides of the controversy into the room at the same time, and by putting a situa-
43 J. Davis, The Interview As Arena (1971); see T. Shaffer note 3, supra (U. Miami).
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tion in which the lawyers felt they had to take one side. The first team handled
that (and not well, really) by insisting on the domination of both sides. The
second team handled it by clearly siding with the client. The third team stayed
much closer to the center of the spectrum of competitive strategies from "I'm
in Charge" to "We'll Sue." They performed well, in this analysis, a mediative
function, without seeming to make the client feel they were not his lawyers. (I
must say this experience tends to blur, for me, the distinction you maintain
between mediation and preventive lawyering.) They also exercised a kind of
unarticulated but precise foresight; they seemed to see that a successful law
office decision depended on the good will-more than that, on the active
assistance--of the bank lawyer. They did not court him, but they involved
him, so that his best talents were involved in helping to solve the problem rather
than in resisting the lawyers' solutions to it. Negatively, if this bank lawyer
had not been engaged in this fashion, or at least neutralized, the lawyers would
have exposed their client to one or the other of two risks. Either the whole deal
would have fallen through, and the client would have lost a piece of business
he needed, or the deal would have been set up on the shifting sands of hostile
attitudes; as you know so well, the chances for breach, misunderstanding, litiga-
tion would then have increased. The third team avoided those risks with a fore-
sight which illustrates well your discussion of the predictive element in pre-
ventive lawyering. They also avoided the destructive edge of counseling com-
petition.
A third kind of analysis in defense of our decision would be an analysis
which looks upon counseling as a collaborative activity. I can best illustrate
that negatively. A dominating style in the counselor (I'm in Charge Here)
discourages collaboration; it implies that the good ideas come from the coun-
selor. That means that the law office decision will depend for the most part
on one set of talents, insights, and sensitivities-the lawyer's. It shuts out all of
the human strengths in the client (and, in the M.L.O.C. case, the other
lawyer). When the problem is tough-and most law office problems are tough,
and not all of them are solved well-two, or three, heads are better than one.
Another negative way to put it is that a "We'll Sue" stance in the three-cor-
nered encounter we had in the M.L.O.C. finals cuts out the talents of the
lawyer for the other side. The winning team (which, I should say here, con-
sisted of Mrs. Dawn Philips and Mr. David Harwood of the University of
Michigan Law School) were superb at avoiding resistance from the bank
lawyer, but, more to the present point, they were even more superb at saying to
him, successfully, "This is our problem. Let us solve it."
'44
4 The most useful inspirational book on this kind of legal counseling that I know about
is J. Simons and J. Reidy, The Human Art of Counseling (1971).
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To sum up my defense of us M.L.O.C. judges, I think we see, more than
my students do, the human, economic and social advantages in involving people
rather than defeating them. The enlistment of people in the law office, the
collaborative strategy, involves the way feelings are acknowledged and ac-
cepted. And it involves the way feelings are written into the law office de-
cisional process. In almost any analysis of the M.L.O.C. finals, the best thing
our lawyers had going for them was the bank lawyer's feeling that the security
problem was soluble and that he wanted to help solve it.
BROWN: This leads me to express some thoughts about the future efforts and
researches and speculations that might be made in furtherance of some of the
concepts discussed in our dialogue.
Implicit in our discussion is the notion that the role of the lawyer is a
significant aspect of the total process of law in our society. We express some
notions about the jurisprudence of the lawyering process. What needs doing,
among other things, is further identification and definition of that process. It
seems to me that the label "lawyer" is neither conclusive, nor necessary to
identification of that role. If in one social system an activity is identified by the
label "lawyer," and in another by the label "notary," neither label is con-
clusive. What needs doing, or at least attempting, is basic definition of the
functions and activities undertaken. 4
5
If our first step is differentiating lawyering activities from nonlawyer
activities, a next step is differentiation, or categorization of lawyering activities.
There is a tendency to separate the activities of lawyers in terms of legal
encyclopedic headings-torts, contracts, procedure, constitutional law, and so
on. I suggest that there be at least two other kinds of distinctions. We ought
to look at law practice using humanness as the basic common denominator.
What are the different human interrelationships in various different aspects
of lawyering?
The lawyer who engages in estate planning practices in a human environ-
ment that is different from a lawyer who engages in say, a vigorous divorce, or
in a management/labor contract negotiation. We should try to differentiate
the lawyering process in terms of the human characteristics that are involved.
On a practical level this sort of analysis can be far more significant than the
areas of specialities being considered by bar associations, such as taxation,
workmen's compensation, criminal law. It is more significant because new
legal knowledge is more readily acquirable than is a new (change of) per-
sonality. A lawyer can suit his mental (knowledge) equipment to his person-
45 See Brown, "Comparative Lawyering: A Proposal for the Study of the Functions of
Lawyers in Different Jurisdictions," 23 Revue Hellenique de Droit International 1 (1970).
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ality more readily than he fits his personality to the needs of a particular kind
of law practice.45b
Another separation which we should explore pervades our dialogue. The
differences between litigation practice and preventive law practice could be
approached as an empirical research project. What do lawyers now do? How
much time is devoted to these two areas of law practice? What are the in-
dications of increase or reduction of lawyers' efforts in these fields? Identifica-
tion of these lawyering activities might help make available for law school
teaching materials derived from law office experiences. 46 We need all this, and
more, in order to help us do another undertaking---evaluation of the lawyering
process.
Next, we need speculation, and hopefully some crystallization, of the criteria
for evaluating performances by lawyers. In law schools we are concerned, in
part at least, with the education, and more recently also with the training (I
distinguish education and training) of persons who will be lawyers. We know
that good lawyering includes more than knowledge, and more than legal
reasoning. These are difficult enough to evaluate. Now throw into the mix
the other activities of lawyers, and ask for criteria that help to evaluate all those
activities. In M.L.O.C. you experienced the problem of comparing three dif-
ferent consultations with a client. You found, as have others who endeavor to
judge and compare lawyer/client consultations, that we have scarcely begun
to develop a method of analyzing consultations. We scarcely know what goes
45b This chart on lawyer-client interaction suggests the interpersonal possibilities in a
bilateral situation: I-
46 Professors Taswell and McDougal have enumerated the tasks of lawyers to include:
Drafting, promoting, interpreting, and amending constitutions.
Drafting, promoting, and interpreting executive orders, administrative rulings, municipal
charters, and so on, and attacking or sustaining their constitutionality.
Drafting and interpreting corporate and private association charters, agreements, dis-
positive instruments, and so on, and attacking or sustaining their validity.
Drafting or otherwise resolving causes or controversies, and making other decisions which
affect the distribution of values, as judges, executives, administrators, arbitrators, referees,
trial examiners, and so on.
Bringing to, or obscuring from, the attention of decision makers the facts and policies
on which judgment should rest.
Advising clients on how to avoid litigation and controversies and on how to make the
best possible use of legal doctrines, institutions, and practices for the promotion of their
private purposes and long-term interest. (Clarifying, inter alia, intentions as to property
disposition, business transactions and family relations.)
Consulting and negotiating with clients, businessmen, opposing counsel, and decision
makers of all kinds.
Reading, digesting, and reinterpreting the decisions and reasoning of past decision
makers of all kinds.
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on, and should go on in that activity; and so we know even less about its evalu-
ation. 4
7
Lawyers, we know, make some decisions. We should begin to identify those
decisions. Can they be put into categories? Are some types more important
than others? What is a decision? In traditional law school education we high-
light the ultimate decision of the appellate court, e.g., judgment affirmed or
judgment reversed, then seek to analyze it, evaluate it, and so on. We might be
able to further law school education of the lawyering process by identifying the
ultimate, or basic decisions in the lawyering process. Then we might be able
to express methods to analyze those decisions. Maybe we can get some help
from mathematicians.
Mathematicians have developed some decision theory.48 There are distinc-
tions between decisions under certainty, and decisions under uncertainty. When
applied to the lawyering process, one question is, certainty or uncertainty about
what? The answer for me is "about fact and about law." Some uncertainties
we have are uncertainties about law, that is, what is the law now and what will
it be at some future time. Law school education is largely concerned with the
law and its uncertainties. The other element of uncertainty concerns fact.
What are the facts? What will the facts be? The lawyering process is con-
cerned with decisions under both kinds of uncertainty and the indications are
that factual uncertainty often presents the realm of greater difficulty. Yet law
school education scarcely includes much reference to factual uncertainty, and
therefore very little about the lawyer's decisional processes and techniques in
dealing with such uncertainty.
Briefly, in preventive law the lawyer must be concerned with uncertainty
about facts in two respects. He is concerned with future facts, for example,
whether a promisor will perform the promises made; whether his client will
be the defendant in some future lawsuit, and so on. He is also concerned with
minimizing the risk of uncertainty regarding present (or past) facts. Since
factual uncertainty (or fact dispute) may give rise to legal trouble, the pre-
47 Professor Gary Bellow, formerly U.S.C. Law Center, currently Professor, Harvard Law
School, and I have discussed from time to time in the context of the lawyering process the
problems of evaluating the performance of a lawyer. My research disclosed nothing
definitive with respect to such evaluation. In connection with the Mock Law Office Competi-
tion (see Brown and Bonanno, "Inter-Scholastic Mock Law Office Competition-A Descrip-
tion and an Invitation," 15 Student Lawyer Journal No. 6 (February 25, 1970), p. 25) it
has been necessary to set up standards for judging the lawyer-client consultation but this
only involves some of the numerous skills and decisional processes of the lawyers. See also
L. Brown, "The Lawyer-Client Consultation" (California C.E.B. Tape 1970).
48 See inter alia, Cowan, "Decision Theory in Law, Science and Technology," 17 Rutgers
L. Rev. 449 (1963); Shubik, "A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust Laws and the
Automobile Industry," 8 Stan. L. Rev. 594 (1966); Comment, "Games Bargaining: A
Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining," 65 Yale L.J. 660
(1956).
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ventive law lawyer often can reduce the risk of such factual uncertainty. For
example, if he puts an agreement in writing, rather than in oral form, the words
are no longer in dispute; he can, for a second example, provide a mechanism
for the preservation of factual evidence while the facts are being made.
49
We need to consider criteria for evaluating all kinds of lawyers' decisions.
The easy answer that comes to mind is that, for the litigating lawyer, winning
a judgment is always a plus and losing is always a negative. That answer is
both too easy, and not sufficient. It fails to take into account evaluation of the
alternatives, for example, settlement; it fails to consider a number of side effects,
e.g., if defendant lost the judgment the defendant may have gained beneficial
delay. It fails to take into account the human elements of victory and defeat-
in short, the effects on the clients.
Equally, let us not accept too easily the criterion that preventive law lawyer-
ing fails if litigation results from a transaction. The client whom a preventive
law lawyer represents may be better served by having some arrangement, even
one that results in foreseeable litigation, than in having no arrangement at all.
For example, it may be better to have an ambiguous labor/management con-
tract than to have none at all. At the other extreme, the absence of subsequent
litigation is an insufficient determinative of preventive lawyering ability. Such
a criterion fails to consider whether the lawyer (or his client) gave up too much
in the preventive law stages (by failing to seek certain rights, or make other
demands) in favor of reducing the risk of later litigation. Or perhaps the pre-
ventive law lawyer was so cautious that he barred a transaction from being
made, although hindsight indicates that his client would have been better
served by a less cautious approach.
In my explorations of preventive law, I have come to believe that the
practice of preventive law seeks, among other things, to minimize the risk of
legal trouble. Legal trouble lies at the root of litigation. What is "legal
trouble"? The striving for preventive law is, affirmatively stated, a striving for
maximizing legal health. What is good legal health? The absence of litigation
and the absence of known dispute are unsatisfactory and incomplete criteria.
In your principal field, wills and estates, you can reliably assert that the failure
of a particular person to have a proper will is ill health although such failure
is unrelated to litigation or dispute of any kind.
50
49 An example is the provision made for the taking of depositions in California where "the
court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
justice" (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017). On the use of psychologists to assess the mental
condition of a testator prior to a possible will contest, see Redmount, "The Use of
Psychologists in Legal Practice," I I The Practical Lawyer 23 (February 1965).
50 See Brown, "Toward a Definition of Legal Health," Preventive Law in the Lawyering
Process (Brown ed.) mimeo. University of Southern California (1963).
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When we seek the cause(s) for dispute, the cause(s) for legal trouble, we
should consider the philosophical implications of "cause." Search for cause
can be a never-ending pursuit. Each item identified as a cause has itself some
precedent cause. 5 1 The cause of the plaintiff's claim may be the collision of
two automobiles. But what caused the collision? The litigation process stops
such causal inquiry at some point.
52
But when we think in preventive law terms we are confronted by such
questions. In developing consensual relations, e.g., purchase and sale of
property, we try to visualize the likelihood that dispute will later arise so that
we can now minimize that risk. So we must understand what the factors are
that can give rise to dispute. Those factors are essentially human characteristics
which the formal law might not regard as relevant.53 They are, however, part
of the stuff of law practice in preventive law and included within the factors
which must be evaluated to help determine a particular client's course of
action. We need to take into account our client's characteristics, and also the
qualities which go to make up the other legal entities with whom our client is
now developing a consensual relation.
The inventory of available techniques which go to make up the tools of
lawyering activities must be organized into a body of discoverable (research-
able) information. The inventory in litigation law, the alternatives available in
litigation practice, are currently more readily available than that in preventive
law practice. We have yet to identify, organize, and classify the techniques of
preventive law practice.
5 4
Much of the content of our discussion concerned the relation of lawyer and
client. That is a relationship that has little been exposed to investigation, re-
search, analysis, and evaluation. Partly the absence of exposure is due to the
apparent confidential lawyer/client relation. Partly it is due to the fact that
appellate court decisions are recorded and publicly available and so these public
decisions easily supply ingredients for study. We have, I believe, been led too
easily to assume the relative importance of judicial decisions, and too little to
recognize the importance of lawyer decisions because of the accident of in-
51 See generally H. Hart and A. Honore, Causation in the Law (1959).
52 "'Proximate cause' . . . is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon
the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. In a philosophical sense, the
consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an act go back to the
discovery of America and beyond." (W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed.
1970)).
53 E.g. the refusal of the court to enforce racially discriminatory restrictive covenants in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5 For an analysis of some preventive law techniques see L. Brown, Preventive Law in
the Lawyering Process (Mimeo, University of Southern California 1963); L. Brown, Manual
of Preventive Law (1950). See also Cavers, "Legal Education and Lawyer-Made Law," 54
W. Va. L. Rev. 177 (1952).
152 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE
formation or lack of information about them. Assume a society, if you will,
in which lawyer decisions are recorded, but court decisions are not. One may
venture the guess that a study of such society would assert the relative im-
portance of lawyering decisions. We need, in my opinion, to do as much as we
can to get at lawyers' decisions. Empirical research of various kinds is needed.
We need tools for doing that research. Court processes do not expose lawyer
decisions.
